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1 This paper is devoted to a highly populous group resident in the world’s most populous
democracy which is systematically deprived of citizenship rights. These are India’s
inter-state circular labour migrants. This paper will describe the ways in which their
citizenship rights and labour freedoms are stolen from them.
2 Reflecting  on  conceptions  of  citizenship,  Arendt  (1979)  reminds  us  that  the
foundational rights that pertain to citizenship are to do with the right of recognition,
inclusion and membership in society. In Arendtian terms, citizenship thus refers to, the
‘right to have rights’. Drawing on these insights, Somers (2008) distinguishes the formal
rights attached to the legal status of citizen from the right to human personhood, which
entails the recognition of people as moral equals endowed by a full inclusion in the
social  and political  community.  Accordingly,  citizenship studies typically  intimate a
two-sited field: the first refers to the geopolitical borders of exclusion that distinguish
‘insiders’  from  ‘outsiders’;  and  the  second  fleshes  out  the  differential  practices  of
membership among those designated as ‘insiders’,  privileging some as ‘interior’ and
others as ‘exterior’. As this paper will show, circular labour migrants in India suffer
social  and political  exclusion not only because they are ‘outsiders’  for the states to
which they migrate, but also because they are ‘exterior’ to the states from which they
migrate.
3 In making these distinctions, Somers draws on, but also departs from, Marshall’s (1950)
classic  formulation  of  citizenship  as  comprising  civil,  political  and  social  rights
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bestowed  by  the  state  on  its  people.  However,  she  carefully  avoids  Marshall’s
assumptions of a linear progression from civil to political to social rights and notes
instead the processes through which citizenship claims are advanced, contested and
institutionalised. In a similar vein, Turner (1990) suggests that citizenship has to do
with, on the one hand, social membership or belonging to a community and, on the
other hand, the right to the allocation of resources. Applying this perspective to her
study of  China’s  so-called ‘floating populations’,  Solinger (1999)  finds that  although
circular labour migrants in that country hold formal citizenship on account of their
being Chinese nationals, they are effectively excluded from both social membership in
the host cities and state-provisioned social entitlements. In this paper, we benefit from
these perspectives of citizenship to analyse the social and political exclusions to which
circular labour migrants in India are subjected.
4 Circular migrant labour refers to workers with or without members of their families
who find employment mainly through a process of internal migration out of the village
or  town  of  their  residence  to  other  parts  of  the  country,  sometimes  over  shorter
distances, sometimes hundreds of kilometres away, for several months in a year. Unlike
other forms of movement, in which the household settles at the destination, circular
migrant labour is devoid of any sense of permanency. Some workers move around from
destination to destination for most of the year performing manual labour for various
employers  or  under  one  labour  contractor;  others  migrate  seasonally  to  the  same
destination for decades, working in a single industry. The paper uses the term ‘circular
labour’  to  denote  the  whole  gamut  of  such  labour  movements,  undertaken  by  the
poorest and most socially disadvantaged groups in the country for manual wage labour,
in a cyclical, seasonal and repetitive manner (Deshingkar 2008). The common thread
across these is that the migrant family is unable to settle at the destination of work,
which creates a critical distinction between these communities and other groups of
urban poor that permanently migrate to the city (Srivastava 2011a).  Several factors
have  contributed  to  the  sharp  rise  in  the  number  of  circular  labour  migrants,
particularly since 1991, as we demonstrate below. This merits an exploration of the
need  to  advance  and  intensify  our  concerns  for  a  more  assured  access  of  circular
migrants to full and equal citizenship rights. It also necessitates the development of a
new language of rights and citizenship with respect to migrant labour that cuts across
all aspects of life: economic, social and political.
5 The moment someone becomes a circular labour migrant, she is likely to be effectively
stripped  of  her  basic  rights,  as  access  to  them  is  blocked  by  high,  often
unsurmountable,  barriers.  This  is  of  central  concern  to  this  paper.  The  number  of
circular migrants is high, possibly accounting for every tenth Indian, a population in
itself larger than the populations of the majority of countries in the world (Deshingkar
& Akhter 2009). Yet it is both extraordinary and instructive that there is such little
public policy concern with the rights of these large economically and socially most
vulnerable populations. The discussion here intends to offer a case for making circular
labour  migrants  –  their  everyday  life,  the  dimensions  of  inclusion/exclusion,  and
restrictions imposed on making claims – a focus of paramount importance for public
policy in India.
6 There is a striking paucity of reliable official data about the numbers and conditions of
this extremely vulnerable population. In a country noted for its excellent systems of
official censuses and surveys, the inadequacy of data regarding labour flows may not be
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a chance lapse. The unilateral emphasis on economic growth and official programmes
such as ‘Make in India’ that valorise home-grown production activity, but without any
discourse on the rights or needs of the labouring populations that fuel such growth,
further  erode  the  value  ascribed  to  workers  in  the  public  imagination.  Evidence
suggests that in the organized sector, value added to the wage share has been either
stagnant  or  facing decline  in  the  last  few years,  not  to  speak of  the  mushrooming
informal  sectors  that  employ  mobile  citizens,  where  under-payment  of  labour  is
widespread  (Abraham  &  Sasikumar  2017;  Jain  &  Sharma  2018).  Increased  flows  of
foreign direct investment are offered not by adhering to the ethics that they follow in
their  points  of  origin,  but  by  making  India  friendly  to  investment  at  the  cost  of
labourers’  livelihoods,  and  by  curtailing  their  basic  political  rights  to  organize
themselves (Dasgupta 2017).
7 It is our view that the overarching framework for articulating migrants’ rights – the
needs  and  claims  as  part  of  their  livelihood,  identity  and  citizenship  –  should  be
contextualized within the notion of an advanced welfare state. India never was a fully
developed welfare state, but in its early decades of freedom it was a developmental and
partially  redistributive  state.  This  declined  further  in  neoliberal  India  after  1991,
although in the years 2004–13, some advances were made in terms of legal guarantees
for certain social rights such as to information, rural employment, free and compulsory
school education, food and nutrition, and for rights in relation to street vendors and
forest use. A welfare state becomes inclusive when it can erase the spaces of exclusion
which are inherent in any state form. An inclusive welfare state is important to the
deepening of democracy since it integrates the needs and requirements of all people
living within its jurisdiction, including those who routinely fall through the cracks of
the system, as this paper argues is the case with internal circular labour migrants in
India.
 
Size and triggers of circular migration
8 The  lack  of  reliable  official  data  on  circular  labour  migration  has  led  to  several
disagreements about its incidence. The 2011 census enumerates 454 million internal
migrants in India, up from 315 million in 2001 and 220 million in 1991. Moreover, a
comparison  of  the  2011  census  figures  with  previous  ones  suggests  that  India’s
workforce has become more mobile. Over 10% of India’s workforce is mobile, according
to the 2011 census, compared with 8% in 1991 (Economic Survey 2017: 266). However,
these figures are likely to be underestimates, given the well-known fact that much of
the internal migration in India tends to be circular, which is not captured in the census
data. Mazumdar et al. (2013) draw on the data provided by the National Sample Survey
Organisation (NSSO) to peg this number at 70 million. They suggest that 17% of the
workforce is comprised of migrant workers, while Tumbe (2014) argues that this figure
reaches 20%. Srivastava (2011c) pegs this figure at 29%, a figure endorsed by the Report
of the Working Group on Migration (Government of India,  Ministry of Housing and
Urban Poverty Alleviation 2017). Using data from the sectoral workforce, Deshingkar
and Akter (2009) estimate that internal migration in India touches 100 million people.
9 Parida  and  Raman  (2018)  demonstrate  that  the  number  of  migrants  within  India
increased from 178 million to 228 million between 1983 and 1993, growing at a rate of
about 5 million per year. Since 1993, it again increased by 124 million people over 14
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years to reach 352 million in 2007–8. Based on their comparison of data supplied by the
NSSO for its 55th round and 64th round, they illustrate that internal migration grew by
about  8.3  million  persons  per  year,  with  a  parallel  increase  in  the  percentage  of
migrants to total population from 23.4% to 29.3% during this period.
10 Scholars remain divided about the factors that spur circular labour migration in India.
Some  observers  claim  that  circular  labour  migration  has  been  exacerbated  by
depressive  forces  such  as  deepening  poverty,  population  pressure,  environmental
degradation  and  depletion  of  natural  resources.  Intensified  mechanization  and  the
resulting  structural  changes  result  in  workers  losing  their  jobs  in  agriculture,
prompting huge influxes in the urban areas (Sainath 2011). Internal migration may also
be  attributed  to  internal  displacement  due  to  multinational  corporation-led
developmentalism,  ethnic  conflicts  or  the  impact  of  a  neoliberal  growth  trajectory
leading  to  pauperization  of  peasants  and  forest-dependent  communities  (Mitra,
Samaddar  & Sen  2017).  Others  have  directed  attention  to  the  attractions  of
urbanization,  better  employment  opportunities  in  cities,  improvement  in  education
levels  and  the  development  of  transport  and  communication.  They  point  to  the
growing  assertion  of  Dalit  and  Backward  Caste  groups,  which  refuse  to  remain
dependent on dominant caste employers in the villages and prefer to work in other
regions  and  localities  (Roy,  In  Press).  In  this  paper,  we  take  the  position  that
irrespective of the factors that spur internal migration, migrant workers suffer several
vulnerabilities in their destination sites, as elaborated below.
11 Parida and Raman’s (2018) analysis of the 64th round of the NSSO data suggests that
absolute numbers of out-migrants as well as out-migration rates are very high in most
of  the  agriculture-dependent  and  relatively  poorer  states.  In  terms  of  rural  out-
migration, Uttar Pradesh topped the list during 1999–2000 (35.6M) and 2007-8 (about
37M),  with  an  absolute  increase  of  1.3  million.  Maharashtra  registered  the  second
highest  number  of  rural  out-migrants,  followed  by  Andhra  Pradesh,  West  Bengal,
Rajasthan, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Odisha and Tamil Nadu during 2007–8. In
terms of the increase in out-migration, Chhattisgarh is followed by Andhra Pradesh,
Rajasthan, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Bihar. It is important to note that the states
with  a  relatively  high  poverty  head-count  ratio  show  higher  levels  of  rural  out-
migration.
12 The recent increase in female migration and the rising share of migrants within the
female  workforce  in  urban  areas  reflect  the  transformation  taking  place  in  India.
Between 1983 and 2008,  the proportion of  female  migrants  within the total  female
population rose from 35 to about 50%, whereas the share of female migrants in the total
female labour force rose from 53 to 73% in the same period.
13 The  states  receiving  the  highest  numbers  of  urban  in-migrants  are  Maharashtra
followed  by  Uttar  Pradesh,  Andhra  Pradesh,  Gujarat,  Tamil  Nadu,  West  Bengal,
Karnataka, Delhi and Rajasthan. But the states that registered the highest increase in
the absolute number of migrants are Delhi (about 6M), Maharashtra (3.25M), Gujarat
(2.2M), Rajasthan (1.66M), Andhra Pradesh (1.5M), West Bengal (1.23M) and Karnataka
(1.22M). The share of migrants in the urban workforce is greater than their share of the
total  population,  and  in  2008,  about  37% of  all  urban  workers  were  migrants.  The
proportion  of  migrants  in  the  workforce  was  highest  (about  59%)  in  Delhi  and
Maharashtra (about 50%) (Parida & Raman 2018).
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Stolen citizenship of circular labour migrants
14 The routine denial of social rights has in effect stolen from these workers their full and
equal citizenship. The Constitution is unambiguous in upholding the rights of Indian
citizens to work and live freely in any part of the country. Article 19, subsections (1)(d)
and (1)(e), dealing with fundamental rights, declares that ‘All citizens shall have the
right […] to move freely throughout the territory of India; to reside and settle in any
part of the territory of India.’ Further, Article 41 of the Constitution enjoins the state
‘within  the  limits  of  its  economic  capacity  and  development’  to  ‘make  effective
provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases
of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved
want’.
15 However,  even  after  seven  decades  of  independence,  safe  and  decent  housing,
healthcare,  education,  childcare  and  social  protection,  subsidized  rations,  old-age
pensions and maternity benefits are systematically denied to circular labour migrants,
despite  some  of  these  rights  being  guaranteed  by  law.  India’s  Supreme  Court  has
maintained that the fundamental right to life guaranteed by the Constitution includes
implicitly the right to all that makes a life with dignity possible.
16 We use the phrase ‘stolen citizenship’ because for the ever-burgeoning footloose labour
force of circular migrants, their formal or notional rights are taken away from them in
the many slippages between the source and the destination. Despite being stark, these
slippages  remain  invisible  by  design  in  terms  of  social  and  economic  policy.  It  is
important  to  recognize  that  these  denials  are  the  outcome  of  policy  and  legal
frameworks  which  fail  to  address  the  hardship  of  this  group.  Adding  to  these
shortcomings  the  othering of  so-called  ‘migrants’  through acts  of  labelling,  such  as
‘outsiders’, ‘encroachers’, ‘illegal occupants’ and ‘criminals’, exacerbates these denials
at  their  destination  where  they  spend  their  working  lives.  The  paperless  migrants
hence find it  increasingly  difficult to  lay  claim upon city  spaces  that  have become
increasingly uninviting. The story of this eclipsed citizenship has emerged as a sine qua
non of the neoliberal model.
 
Housing
17 Though shelter is a basic human right, the state has failed to realise it. Even where the
Contract Labour Law makes this a liability (of the contractor), the state, in its urge to
promote  ‘ease  of  business’,  has  rendered such provisions  toothless  with  its  lack  of
implementation  (Srivastava  2011b:  185).  The  contrast  with  China  in  this  regard  is
instructive.  While  in  China,  20–40%  of  migrant  workers  have  been  provided  with
dormitory accommodation by employers, the comparable figure in India is negligible
(Mahadevia,  Zhiyan  &  Ziuming  2010).  Moreover,  while  in  China  the  government’s
stance has shifted more recently in favour of residential rights and housing for migrant
workers, that has not been the case in India (Srivastava 2011b: 186).
18 These floating populations of labourers are constantly moving between their villages
and different urban work destinations. They are mostly unable to afford housing even
in slums. Either they are rendered homeless (living on pavements, under flyovers, near
railway  stations)  or  they  stay  in  shared  rented  rooms  in  deplorable  conditions.
Sugathan  and  Jayaram  state  that  millions  of  urban  migrants  are  pushed  to  the
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peripheries of the city ‘both spatially as well as in the imaginations of urban planners’.
‘They slip through the cracks in the patchwork of grandiose urban development and
housing  policies.  These  policies  remain  disconnected  from  the  country’s  socio-
economic reality of growing rural–urban migration’ (Sugathan & Jayaram 2018). The
Aajeevika Bureau finds that the other most common living arrangement for many of




19 Circular migrants typically live and work in conditions which render them particularly
vulnerable  to  poor  health,  especially  to  occupational  diseases  and  disabilities  from
workplace accidents.  ‘A multitude of factors affect the health of migrants,  including
inadequate nutrition, poor housing conditions, hazardous occupational conditions, lack
of access to health care services and a low level of awareness’ (Borhade 2011).
20 Given the informalised conditions of work, circular migrants often live and work at the
same place, which results in unduly long working hours. Getting leave even for medical
treatment is often impossible.  Since most such workers do not have a contract and
their payment modalities are such that they do not receive regular wages, it is difficult
to set money aside for medical emergencies. Further, circular migrants are perceived as
a  burden on the public  service  system in  destination areas  and face  prejudice  and
disrespectful behaviour (Shah & Lerche 2017). In the case of healthcare, lack of respect
can negatively impact service delivery. Lastly, in case of grave injury or ailment, the
circular migrant usually would have to fall out of the workforce and face destitution as
there is no time in their schedule to allow for care and rest. Beyond a lack of access to
formal/public support systems on account of highly informalised conditions of work
and lack of formal identification, they do not have access to social support structure in
the destination, like sedentary families do, leading to a double exclusion: from public
services  as  well  as  from  normative  support  structures  that  form  the  fall-back
mechanism for most underprivileged members of society.
 
Childcare and education
21 Several  studies  show  that  long-term  migration  contributes  to  better  educational
attainment for wards in the source region (e.g. Deshingkar & Sandi 2011: 51). The same,
however, cannot be said about circular migrants. Studies show that the bulk of seasonal
migrants are in the prime working-age group (15–45 years), and since these migrants
come from the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the working population, their
own educational attainment is negligible. A majority of those who are married in this
age  group  have  young  children.  Elaborating  on  their  specific  vulnerabilities,  Smita
(2008) comments:
They are subjected to hazardous travel between villages and work sites, and a life of
severe deprivation at work sites. Girls endure even more deprivations than boys. In
the  villages,  these  children find  acceptance  neither  in  school nor  in  the  larger
community and are viewed as  outsiders.  Furthermore,  because of  the nature of
their  parents’  labour  patterns,  these  children  are  difficult  to  trace,  and  are
therefore easily left out of the education system.’
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22 Migration of either one or both the parents has the potential of reducing the child’s
probability of being educated (Srivastava 2011b: 180). As Deshingkar observes in a study
of circular migration in Andhra Pradesh, one of the most common consequences of
circular  migration  is  the  disruption  of  the  child’s  education.  ‘There  are  no  formal
facilities  and  children  end  up  helping  their  parents  or  playing  by  the  roadside’
(Deshingkar 2008: 188). In western Maharashtra, in sugar-cane-cutting work alone, it is
estimated that about 180,000 children from 0–14 years old migrate with their parents
every year, of which at least 75,000 are aged between 8 and 14 years.1 These children
have to contribute to household chores (Srivastava 2011a: 24) and miss out on school.
23 This leads to denial of the child’s constitutional right to free and compulsory education
and nutritional support through school meals. Joining school in the destination site
often becomes difficult because of differences in language and barriers to entry. Rarely
able to get back to schooling in the long term, these persons are entrenched in low-
skilled, insecure and low-paid sectors of the labour market as adults, thus completing
the vicious cycle of poverty and distress migration (Whitehead 2011). While poverty is
understood as the prime factor for parents not sending their children to school, the
importance of ensuring access to schooling for a mobile population needs to be further
highlighted.
24 The denial of full and equal citizenship is the direct consequences of state policies as
efforts  to  cater  to  this  group are  virtually  non-existent.  The  pursuit  of  market-led
growth has resulted in primacy being accorded to the imperatives of capital and a race
to the bottom as states cut social expenditure. While seasonal migration is not a novel
phenomenon, the cumulative impact of a deepening agrarian crisis,  an employment
crisis and a crisis of social reproduction accentuated in the phase of liberalization have
added to the sheer volume of migration and the confinement of migrants to the lower
socio-economic  class.  There  has  been a  higher  migration  of  lower  social  groups  to
urban areas compared to earlier periods.2 Much of this is  attributed to rural–urban
disparities  in  socio-economic  development  and  increasing  urbanization  (Smriti  &
Vakulabharanam 2018).  While the vagaries of the market and concomitant agrarian
distress  have  made  agriculture  unviable  in  ensuring  adequate  employment,
deregulation of industry has meant a steady dilution of whatever labour laws remained,
making workers more vulnerable in other sectors. Constitutional obligations require
the state to ensure adequate means of employment at citizens’  place of origin,  and
dignified living conditions at their probable destination. The neoliberal state has failed
in providing either, leading to uneven development and a denial of fundamental rights
along with gross violation of labour laws.
 
Stolen freedoms of circular migrants: the ‘super-
exploited’ of India’s unequal labour markets
25 India’s informal economy is rife with violations of basic labour rights,  with circular
migrants occupying the most hazardous and least remunerative segments of labour
value chains (Breman 2013). Realisation of human rights and citizenship is untenable
without labour rights as a central pillar. The widespread infringements of the latter in
India highlights that circular labour migrants have been subjected to a theft of their
basic freedoms. There is a misconception that these infringements occur because the
informal economy falls beyond the ambit of labour laws. Contrary to this perception a
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large  set  of  central  and  state  laws  are  applicable  to  informal  workers,  seeking  to
regulate the following aspects: physical conditions, duration, timing and remuneration
at work; industrial and labour relations; conditions of work of disadvantaged workers;
and social security of informal workers (including health, maternity, life and accident,
old age and unemployment insecurity)  (National  Commission for  Enterprises  in the
Unorganized Sector [NCEUS] 2006, 2007).  The laws vary in terms of their applicable
criteria,  coverage  as  well  as  restrictions,  but  cover  large  parts  of  the  unorganized
workforce (Chandrasekhar & Ghosh 2002). These laws are based on a recognition of the
following principles:  (a)  that capital  has an inherent tendency to exploit  labour for
greater profits and therefore the fundamental role of labour law must be to balance out
the interest of capital and labour (Papola & Pais 2007); (b) that values of social justice
and equity  that  are  enshrined in  the  Indian Constitution are  unachievable  without
making labour rights and welfare a reality (Singh J. 2003); and (c) that a sustainable
growth  of  the  economy  and  industry  is  untenable  without  a  healthy  and  secure
workforce (Papola & Pais 2007).
26 Notwithstanding the aforementioned labour laws, violation of basic worker rights is
pervasive in the country’s informal economy. There are two noteworthy mechanisms
that facilitate such unabated labour rights violations. The first is the under-resourcing,
under-staffing and disempowerment of the labour departments and regulatory bodies
in the country, which result in near-complete failure to inspect or prosecute violators
(NCEUS 2007). That around 92% of the workforce of the country is unorganised3 is not
necessarily due to lack of laws, but due to firms and establishments circumventing the
existing laws with impunity in the absence of effective regulatory bodies (Government
of India 2002). This allows employers to easily keep workers off their books, declaring
their firm to be smaller than minimum-size criteria of applicable laws with no real
threat of being found out (Jain & Sharma 2018). The state of Gujarat exemplifies the
complicit nature of the state in all of this. Breman (2013) as well as Hirway and Shah
(2011) argue that there has been a conscious thrust by the state government to not
monitor compliance with minimum wage laws so as to attract investors by assuring
non-interference.
27 The second mechanism that creates conditions of grave labour rights violation is the
dilution  of  labour  laws  themselves,  including  the  weakening  of  trade  unions  and
workers’  organizations,  the  relaxation  of  worker  hiring  and  firing  laws  and  the
deepening casualisation of work.  A key strategy has been to pit  states against each
other in a race to the bottom for attracting investors through erosion of labour and
civil  rights  of  poor groups.  This  design can be seen in the proposed Labour Codes.
Ostensibly, the rationale for this initiative is laudable: to rationalise and make coherent
the complex set of labour laws prevalent in the country. However, critiques from trade
unions,  labour rights  activists  and lawyers  suggest  that  the draft  Codes  hide many
features that further erode the rights, power and security of workers (Singh M. 2017;
Singh R. 2017; TNN 2017). There is therefore an urgent need for policy prescriptions
that place liability for workers’ welfare and security on principal employers and on big
firms sitting at the high end of supply chains (International Labour Office [ILO], 2016).
Despite this pressing policy need, the draft Wage Code released by the current central
government has moved in the very opposite direction. While the government and its
supporters are widely proclaiming the Codes to be beneficial for the labouring classes, a
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legal analysis of its provisions reveals that it  attempts what Jenkins (2004: 334) has
called ‘[labour] reform by stealth’.
28 The specific  interaction of  circular  migrants  with  such a  policy  and administrative
regime is shaped by their location in India’s labour market. According to the ILO (2013),
the country’s labour market is one of the most segmented in the world, being divided
into separate sub-markets that function based on distinct labour practices and norms.
Here, circular migrants tend to occupy the most disadvantageous segments with the
most  adverse  terms  and  conditions  of  work,  and  with  highly  limited  vertical  or
horizontal mobility. Borrowing the Marxian term, circular migrants are often referred
to as the ‘super-exploited’ (Shah & Lerche 2017; Jain & Sharma 2018). These segments
are  further  divided  along  the  lines  of  gender,  caste,  tribe  and  religion,  such  that
circular migrants are disproportionately represented by historically disadvantaged and
stigmatised social groups of Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims, with significant overlap with
the categories of child and bonded labourers (NCEUS 2007; Papola 2012; Breman 2013;
Shah & Lerche 2017).
29 The consistency  of  social  status  between erstwhile  bonded labour  (lower  caste  and
tribal  group  members)  and  workers  under  conditions  of  neo-bondage  is  not  a
coincidence. The majority of those toiling at the bottom of the economy and in the
ranks of circular labour migrants are from such historically oppressed social groups.
This is evidence of the complex way in which servitude (built into a social system) has
been reproduced under conditions of modern-day capitalism in India.
30 The  inequality  in  the  labour  market  is  such  that  employers  are  free  to  use  the
desperation of vast, impoverished, circulating labouring classes and exploit them by:
(1) extending their work day (through blatant or hidden ways of unpaid or underpaid
overtime, especially through on-site living); (2) increasing the intensity of their work
(i.e. the degree of mental and physical exertion needed to perform tasks, especially in
hazardous and strenuous work and living conditions where employer refuses to bear
any  costs  of  safety  or  basic  facilities);  (3)  payment  below  value  (underpayment  of
migrant workers vis-à-vis local workers, and unequal pay for women and children); and
(4) abandoning the security of the household (by refusing to pay or take responsibility
for workplace accidents, illnesses, education of children or the old age of the worker)
(Frank  1978;  Jain  &  Sharma  2018).  Consequently,  large  costs  get  shifted  on  to  the
migrant  household:  employing  them  during  their  productive  years  for  maximum
extraction without payment of living wages; dispensing with them as soon as younger,
cheaper and stronger workers are available; and leaving the household without any
protection  or  security  for  the  workers’  non-productive  years.  The  costs  of  such
abandonment  are  ultimately  passed  on  to  the  labour  of  women  in  the  migrant
households and inter-generationally to the children (Jain 2018).
 
Suspended political rights and exclusion from
sedentary governance structures
31 Underpinning  such  social  exclusions  is  political  exclusion.  Voting  rights  in  India
continue  to  be  restricted  to  the  places  of  people’s  usual  domicile.  For  migrant
labourers, who give the best part of their working lives to multiple locations in urban
and rural India, such restrictions have two implications. First, this reduces their value
to the destination locality’s politicians, who do not need their votes to win elections at
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all. Second, migrant labourers are not able to always go back to their homes during
election time to cast their votes: ample reportage on the political exclusion of migrant
workers from the 2015 Bihar Vidhan Sabha elections bears this out (Roy 2016).  The
figures for the 2014 Lok Sabha elections were comparable: slightly fewer respondents
reported being able  to  return home to cast  their  vote during the elections held in
April/May  of  that  year.  Indeed,  several  studies  testify  to  the  political
disenfranchisement of circular labour migrants (Roy 2016; Aajeevika Bureau 2012).
32 The deep sedentary bias of policy design and the institutional set-up at local, state and
national levels mean that almost all social protection and welfare schemes assume the
existence of a sedentary citizen-subject, whereby the allocation of funds to a scheme
depends on the number of beneficiaries in a state. In the case of circular migrants, such
a system fails the citizen, as the person is denied access to a range of entitlements, from
legal rights of political representation (voting) to accessing public services and social
protection measures, owing to them not being enumerated in their destination areas.
33 Portability of  rights necessitates a healthy relationship between the centre and the
states, particularly with respect to the devolution of funds, allocation of food grains
through  the  public  distribution  system  and  implementation  of  centrally  sponsored
schemes. Only by advancing the welfare state would circular labour migrants develop a
sense of fuller and equal belonging to the state, wherever they may be. Further, the
states should have more autonomy for operationalizing imaginative welfare schemes
for migrant workers. A notion of universal rights that is portable and inclusive needs to
be the principal bedrock for the portability of migrants’ entitlements. It is common to
see governments of  migrant-receiving states abdicating basic  responsibility towards
their  migrant  population  and  undermining  the  portability  features  of  centrally
mandated  schemes.  Politically,  preserving  the  rights  of  internal  migrants  would
require  curtailing  the  autonomy  of  states  to  abandon  responsibility  towards  their
migrant populations, with the central government assuming the role of defending the
rights of vulnerable populations, moving across state borders, including the financial
responsibility of providing for them where needed.
34 Public policy solutions are difficult, but not impossible. The southern Indian state of
Kerala which is known for its developmental reasoning with respect to migration flows
(see Raman 2012) has introduced a comprehensive health security scheme for migrant
workers. Titled Awaz, the scheme provides cashless and paperless medical treatment
benefits up to INR15,000 (£166) to all migrant labourers per year using biometric cards
in more than 300 empanelled hospitals, including private ones. The labourers are also
entitled to  a  death insurance of  INR2 lakh (£2,222).  The enrolment  for  the scheme
began on 1 November 2017 and makes use of government-issued identity cards such as
the Aadhaar card or Election card. Till now, 189,013 workers have been enrolled under
the Awaz scheme, of which 177,597 are male, 11,365 female and 51 are transgender, the
latter being an example of inclusive migrant welfare in the state of Kerala.
35 Community-based  hostels  in  village  schools  with  grandparents  as  care-givers  can
ensure  a  low-cost  and  least  disruptive  way  of  allowing  children  to  continue  their
education. Working men’s and women’s hostels with low-cost dormitories for workers,
combined with affordable social and rental housing, can allow them a roof over their
heads at their destination. Community kitchens serving nutritious subsidised cooked
meals can secure nutrition and free up savings for single migrants.  Social and food
protection rights can be made portable without tying them into the highly problematic
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framework of compulsory biometric linkage which enables intrusive state surveillance.
But for this it is imperative for states to acknowledge the daily reality of this routine
theft of citizenship and freedoms from millions of India’s most impoverished, exploited
and socially vulnerable workers. Once they do this, they must be compelled by public
action to secure them these freedoms and citizenship rights.
36 This paper has analysed how millions of circular labour migrants in India are deprived
of  their  fundamental  rights.  They  are  often reduced to  being  treated in  their  own
country in the way undocumented immigrants should not be treated. The migrants are
mostly impoverished and socially disadvantaged inhabitants of rural areas and leave
their villages to find work in the cities, where industries, especially in the construction
sector, have a huge demand for daily wage labourers. In a state that is eager to prove its
business-friendly  credentials,  labour  laws are  twisted and violated,  leaving workers
vulnerable and one of the most exploited sections of  society.  A huge percentage of
these labourers are Dalits or Adivasis, two of the most persecuted and marginalised
sections of Indian society and which are prone to further neglect by the state.
37 With no access to proper housing and healthcare, the safety of these workers’ families
is  compromised.  In  a  diverse  country  like  India  where  every  state  has  a  different
language, children of migrant labourers end up not going to school, jeopardising their
chances of upward mobility in the future. In order to secure the constitutional rights
and freedoms of  circular migrants and their  families  as  equal  citizens,  an inclusive
welfare state is needed that caters to the interests of the marginalised sections of the
society and is not restricted by neoliberal compulsions.
38 The era of neoliberalism has led to capitalism in the Indian case to adapt to forms of
hegemony that are entirely compatible with post-slavery neo-bondage. While for the
first  time  the Indian  labour  market  has  seen  a  structural  shift  in  favour  of  non-
agricultural employment, especially in construction, new jobs are marred by such poor
conditions of work and hostile modes of inclusion that rather than offering a release
from structures of social domination, they reproduce and intensify the same.
39 Denial  of  basic,  constitutionally  provided  rights  of  individuals  through  adverse
conditions of inclusion in the labour market, as evidenced in the case of circular labour
migrants,  is  a  regressive  tendency.  This  post-slavery  era  is  not  marked  by  greater
labour  freedoms or  their  greater  access  to  their  rights  as  citizens  and as  workers.
Instead it has fostered debased and unjust conditions of servitude and neo-bondage as
the likely destinies of these workers. This calls into question the role of the neoliberal
state,  which  nominally  subscribes  to  democracy  while  simultaneously  fostering  a
regime  of  economic  growth  that  bars  millions  of  its  toiling  citizens  from  availing
themselves of their basic citizenship and labour rights.
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NOTES
1. Janarth 2006 as cited in Srivastava 2011a: 24.
2. http://epc2012.princeton.edu/papers/121017.
3. This paper uses the term ‘unorganized’ or ‘informal’ interchangeably. As the NCEUS
(2007) report argues, ‘unorganized’ is synonymous with the term ‘informal’, the latter
being a more commonly used term in international literature. The paper also follows
the distinction made by the NCEUS report between the unorganized/informal sector
(enterprise concept) and unorganized/informal workers (employment concept), as the
latter are found in both organized and unorganized enterprises.
ABSTRACTS
With  the  rise  of  capitalism  in  post-colonial  India,  initially  as  a  subsidiary  part  of  a  mixed
economy with the state occupying its ‘commanding heights’, and later, especially after 1991, in
the  context  of  a  new hegemony of  globalised neoliberal  capital,  it  was  widely  assumed that
unfree labour, especially feudal forms of slavery in debt bondage, would vanish into history. This,
however, has not happened. Inter-generational bondage to a single household has indeed become
rarer. But the spread of capitalism has not created conditions of ‘free’ labour in India; instead
pre-capitalist relations of labour unfreedoms continue to persist in abundance in the modified
form  of  neo-bondage.  This  paper  looks  closely  at  one  category  of  Indian  workers  –  namely
circular labour migrants – who are particularly susceptible to these forms of neo-slavery.
Avec le développement du capitalisme dans l’Inde post-coloniale, considéré à l’origine comme
une  partie  subsidiaire  d’une  économie  mixte  dont  l’État  était  censé  occuper  les  « hauts
commandements »,  et plus tard – spécialement après 1991–,  dans le contexte de l’hégémonie
nouvelle d’un capital néo-libéral globalisé, il était largement admis que le travail non-libre, en
particulier les formes féodales de l’esclavage pour dettes appartiendraient à l’histoire. Ce n’est
cependant pas arrivé. La dépendance intergénérationelle à une seule famille s’est sensiblement
raréfiée. Mais la diffusion du capitalisme n’a pas créé les conditions du travail « libre » en Inde ;
au  contraire,  les  relations  précapitalistes  du  travail  non-libre  ont  changé  et  persistent
aujourd’hui  sous  forme  de  néo-esclavage  ou  de  néo-dépendance.  Cet  article  examine  avec
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précision une catégorie de travailleurs que l’on nomme les migrants circulaires en Inde, et qui
sont particulièrement exposés à ces formes de néo-esclavage.
Con el desarrollo del capitalismo en India post-colonial,  considerado inicialmente como parte
subsidiaria  de  una  economía  mixta  de  la  que  el  Estado  tomaría  las  riendas,  y  luego  –
especialmente  desde  1991–,  en  el  contexto  de  la  nueva  hegemonía  de  un  capital  neoliberal
globalizado,  se  consideraba  que  el  trabajo  no-libre,  en  especial  las  formas  feudales  de  la
esclavitud por deudas pasarían a la historia. No fue así. Si bien la dependencia intergeneracional
dentro de una misma familia es cada vez menos frecuente,  la difusión del  capitalismo no ha
creado las condiciones del trabajo “libre” en India. Por el contrario, las relaciones pre-capitalistas
del trabajo no-libre han dado paso a nuevas formas, sumamente persistentes, de neo-esclavitud y
de  neo-dependencia.  Este  artículo  examina  con  precisión  una  categoría  de  trabajadores
designados, en India, como migrantes circulares, particularmente expuestos a estas formas de
neo-esclavitud.
Com o desenvolvimento do capitalismo na Índia pós-colonial, primeiro como parte subsidiária de
uma economia mista onde o Estado segurava as rédeas da economia e a seguir, sobretudo depois
de 1991, com a nova hegemonia do capital neo-liberal globalizado, era geralmente suposto que o
trabalho não-livre, e nomeadamente as formas feudais de escravidão por dívidas, sumiriam no
passado. Porém, isso não aconteceu. Se bem que a servidão intergeracional numa mesma família
tornou-se mais rara, a expansão do capitalismo não criou condições de trabalho « livre » na Índia.
Em  vez  disso,  as  relações  de  trabalho  não-livre  pre-capitalistas  persistem  largamente como
formas modificadas de neo-escravidão e neo-dependência. Este artigo examina mais detidamente
uma categoria de trabalhadores, designados como migrantes circulares, particularmente sujeitos
a estas formas de neo-escravidão.
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